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CEASE V ATEW ENGLAND AQUARIUM:




In the recent case Citizens to End Animal Suffering and Exploitation,
Inc. (CEASE) v. New England Aquarium,1 the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts prohibited a dolphin and several
animal rights groups acting on behalf of the dolphin from bringing suit
in federal court.2 The parties were protesting the transfer of the dolphin
(Kama) in a manner alleged to be inconsistent with the permitting
requirements of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA).3 The
court dismissed the case on a motion for summary judgment in favor of
the defendants on the basis that none of the named plaintiffs had standing
to sue. Although the court summarily dismissed Kama's claim,4 it
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 1996.
1. 836 F. Supp. 45 (D.C. Mass. 1993).
2. The plaintiffs in the case included the organizations themselves (Citizens to End
Animal Suffering and Exploitation, Progressive Animal Welfare Society, and Animal
Legal Defense Fund) and the individual members of the organizations. Id. at 50.
3. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988)
(MMPA). The MMPA aims to protect and conserve marine mammals by imposing
limits on the taking and importation of marine mammals for purposes of scientific
research, public display, or enhancing the survival or recovery of a species, including
the method of transporting mammals after capture. Before any such animal or product
can be transported, the Secretary of Commerce must issue an authorizing permit. 16
U.S.C. § 1374 (1988). Kama was transferred pursuant to a "Letter of Agreement"
issued to the Navy. Plaintiffs protested this modification of the permitting process by
filing this suit. CEASE v. New England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. at 47.
4. The court found that the dolphin lacked standing to maintain the action as the
MMPA "expressly authorized suits brought by persons, not animals." CEASE v. New
England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. at 49. Further, the court would not imply
Congressional or Presidential intent to give marine mammals standing without a clear
expression of such intent. Id. at 50. The court noted that, although the MMPA itself
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thoroughly discussed whether or not the plaintiffs' individual members,
as individuals, had met the requirement of "injury in fact" necessary for
the plaintiffs to have standing. The court concluded that they had not.5
With less discussion, the court reached the same conclusion regarding the
organizational plaintiffs.6
The MMPA was passed in 1972 for the purpose of prohibiting the
harassing, catching, and killing of marine mammals so that they would
continue to be "a significant functioning element in the ecosystem of
which they are a part.' Essentially, the MMPA gives the Secretaries
of the Interior and Commerce the guidance and authority necessary to
establish general limitations on the taking of all marine mammals,8 and
within those limits, the power to issue permits that allow the transport of
certain marine mammals.9 The MMPA also requires that the public be
informed of the action to be taken and the evidence upon which that
decision was reached.'"
Section 1374 of the MMPA outlines the permit procedures for public
display and scientific research of marine mammals." It sets forth
requirements for application, public notice and hearing, and permit
review." In order to transport a marine mammal an individual or
organization must obtain a permit from the Secretary of Commerce.' 3
The Secretary of Commerce must publish notice in the Federal Register
of any application for a permit.' This allows interested parties to review
permit applications and request a hearing on the matter. 5 The Secretary
does not state who may bring suit, it refers to the Administrative Procedures Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994), which explicitly permits only "persons" to bring
suit. Id. at 50 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702). The court also noted that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 17(b), which discusses the capacity of an individual to sue or be sued, has
been held to apply only to human entities. Id. at 49. At the request of the defendants,
Kama's name was removed from the caption of the case. Id. at 50.
5. CEASE v. New England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. at 50-56. See infra part II.
6. Id. at 56-58.
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1361(2) (1988).
8. 16 U.S.C. § 1373 (1988).
9. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(a) (1988).
10. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(d) (1988).
11. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(c) (1988).
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(d) (1988).
13. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(a)(4) (1988).
14. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(d)(2) (1988).
15. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(d)(4) (1988).
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is authorized to conduct a hearing if it is requested. 16 Plaintiffs in this
case argued that the Secretary's modification of the required permitting
process denied them the right to request a public hearing. 7 The court
dismissed this claim without discussing whether a genuine issue of
material fact indeed existed. In so doing, the court furthered the
government's ability to act without public knowledge, contrary to the
explicit provisions of the MMPA.
A permit, once issued, must specify the methods of capture and
subsequent care of the marine mammal. 8 An interested party may
request judicial review of any permit issued under section 1374 of the
MMPA.' 9 The legislative history of the Act clearly emphasizes the
public's right to information.' If the district court had granted plaintiffs
standing and had reached the merits of the case, the court would have
been unable to reconcile the inconsistencies between the clear mandates
of the MMPA and the permit process and the Letter of Agreement that
the Secretary utilized in allowing Kama to be transported without a
permit.21
New England Aquarium acts in conjunction with recent Supreme
Court and Circuit Court decisions to close the courtroom doors to
environmental groups on grounds of standing. ' This Note will discuss
the ramifications of the New England Aquarium decision on the ability
of environmental groups to exercise their rights to challenge governmen-
tal actions under the MMPA. It will examine the various requirements
for standing by tracing several lines of cases, particularly those involving
environmental plaintiffs. The Note will then demonstrate that those
decisions cannot be reconciled with the court's reasoning in the subject
case.
16. Id. While plaintiffs had no assurance that they would receive judicial review
of their complaint, they argued that failure to receive notice of the permit was in itself
an injury. CEASE v. New England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. at 55.
17. The Secretary transferred Kama pursuant to a Letter of Agreement, a procedure
that provided no public notice. CEASE v. New England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. at 47-
48.
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(b)(2)(B), § 1374(c)(1) (1988).
19. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(d)(6) (1988).
20. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1488, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1972).
21. See supra text accompanying note 3.
22. See, e.g. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Competitive
Enterprise Inst. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 901 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
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I. LEGAL HISTORY
In order to challenge any agency action taken pursuant to the
previously outlined sections of the MMPA, the plaintiff must have
standing. 3  The test for standing has three requirements. First, the
litigant must have suffered an "injury in fact" to a legally-protected
interest that is "concrete and individualized, and particularized" and
"actual or imminent." Second, there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the challenged action of the defendant. Third, the
injury must be redressable by a favorable decision.'
What is sufficient for "injury in fact" has fluctuated over the years.
In Sierra Club v. Morton" the Supreme Court liberally interpreted the
injury in fact requirement. In that case, the court held that injury to
"[a]esthetic and environmental well-being" could constitute injury in
fact.26 The Court did require, however, that the injury be to the party
seeking review.' Thus, if the threatened harm is too far in the future,
too vague, or too speculative, that element of standing would not be
satisfied. The Supreme Court also discussed the requirement of concrete
and individualized injury in Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the Wr."
The Court held that a plaintiff's status as a citizen by itself was not
sufficient to satisfy the "injury in fact" element of standing, because a
citizen only has the generalized and abstract interest of all citizens in
constitutional governance. It held that a concrete injury is needed to
assure that the litigant would present a complete perspective based on a
specific set of facts.29
23. Standing satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement of the Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
24. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citations
omitted).
25. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). The Sierra Club, an environmental organization, claimed
that construction of a recreation area in a national forest would violate federal laws.
Under this Court's ruling, people who use national forests have standing. Id. at 734.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 735.
28. 418 U.S. 208 (1974). Plaintiffs sued as "citizens of the United States,"
claiming that the Incompatibility Clause of Article I, § 6 of the U.S. Constitution was
violated by the fact that several congressmen were also members of the Armed Forces
Reserve. Id. at 208.
29. Id. at 221.
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An early case defining the requirement of "injury in fact" under the
MMPA was Animal Welfare Institute v. Kreps.30 Plaintiff, an animal
rights group interested in the health and well-being of seals, challenged
waivers issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) 31 which
permitted importation of seal skins. Speaking for the court, Judge Skelly
Wright found it logical for animal rights groups to defend animals who
can't defend their own interests in court, and held that plaintiffs had a
legitimate stake in the outcome of the controversy. The simple fact that
plaintiffs were on the same footing as the public at large did not mean
that plaintiffs did not have standing. The court held that standing does
not depend on the size of the harm to the party, and that a killing by a
third party was a taking sufficient to cause "injury in fact" to plain-
tiffs. 32
Recently, there has been movement away from Judge Wright's
liberal construction of the standing requirement toward a narrower
interpretation. This trend of narrowing the circumstances under which
environmental groups have "injury in fact" to sue was furthered by the
Supreme Court's decision in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation.33 In
30. 561 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1977). This case involved permits allowing
importation of sealskins from South Africa. Included among the skins were those from
seals less than eight months old or those which were still nursing. Id. at 1004. An
importation of either type is expressly prohibited by the MMPA. 16 U.S.C. § 1372(b)(2)
(1972).
31. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has the duty and authority to
issue such waivers pursuant to 50 C.F.R. § 216.31 (1988).
32. Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d at 1007, 1008. The same court
declined to follow Kreps in Dellums v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
863 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1988), distinguishing it on the basis that the parties in Kreps
were active participants in the controversy and therefore had a specific interest in the
outcome of the case, while the Dellums parties were not active participants. Id. at 973.
The plaintiff inDellums was an unemployed African uranium worker who was protesting
animportation license for bringing uranium hexafluoride from South Africa to the United
States. The court characterized this protest as political as the claim was brought under
the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5116 (1988). Id.
at 973-974. The Dellums court dismissed, noting that the Supreme Court had earlier
stated that there is no "injury in fact" where the only injury claimed is "widely-held,
nonquantifiable, and of political or ideological nature." Id. at 972 (citing United States
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974)).
33. 497 U.S. 871 (1990). Plaintiffs claimed injury caused by mining activities
performed by the Bureau of Land Management in the vicinity of an outdoor recreation
area. Plaintiffs filed affidavits which indicated use of an unspecified tract of land near
where some mining activities had occurred. Id. at 875.
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that case, the Court refused to overrule the lower court decision that held
that the plaintiffs' members' recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment of
land in the vicinity of land affected by agency actions was insufficient to
show that their interests were actually affected. The Court stated that
missing facts could not be presumed to establish an injury which was
merely generally alleged.' The Court also affirmed the lower court's
rejection of the "ecosystem nexus"35 argument made by plaintiffs in an
effort to establish "injury in fact."
The latest case by the Supreme Court in this area is Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife,36 a decision that further refines and narrows the
requirements for standing for environmental plaintiffs. This case involv-
ed agency action under the Endangered Species Act, which was alleged
to threaten marine mammals "in general."" The Court stated that the
desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely aesthetic
purposes, is a cognizable interest for standing purposes.3 9 However, the
resultant injury must affect the claimant in a personal and individualized
way. Further, the plaintiff must demonstrate imminence of injury in all
circumstances.' Along with the ecosystem nexus, the Court also
34. Id. at 885-889.
35. The ecosystem nexus would grant standing to plaintiffs who suffered harm
anywhere in the natural environment contiguous to that involved in the suit. Id.
36. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
37. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988) (ESA). The
ESA requires that federal agencies ensure that their actions are not likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of any species listed as endangered or threatened. The agency
also may not destroy or modify the habitat of any listed species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)
(1988).
38. Plaintiffs, organizations dedicated to wildlife conservation and other
environmental causes, challenged a regulation of the Secretary of the Interior which
required other agencies to confer with him under the ESA only with respect to federally
funded projects in the United States and on the high seas.
39. Lujanv. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561-562. The Supreme Court first
held this in the 1972 case of Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972); see also
Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221 (1986), where the
Court held that an environmental organization had standing because the whale watching
and studying of their members would be adversely affected by continued whale
harvesting. Id. at 230-231 n.4.
40. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564-566.
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rejected the "animal nexus" 4 and the "vocational nexus"42 tests of
directness of injury put forth by the plaintiffs.
As the requirements for "injury in fact" have becomemore difficult
for environmental plaintiffs to meet, such plaintiffs have relied on
"informational harm" as a basis for injury in fact. In 1990, the D.C.
Circuit decided Competitive Enterprise Institute v. National Highway
Traffic Safety Administtion," holding that plaintiffs have suffered
information harm when (1) the information is essential to their activities,
(2) the lack of information will render their activities infeasible, and (3)
there is a plausible link between the agency's action, the information,
and the injury.' Thus, informational harm could satisfy the injury in
fact prong of the test for standing in some circumstances.45
In 1991 the D.C. Circuit revisited informational harm in Foundation
on Economic Trends v. Lyng.46 The court noted it could not find any
cases where standing had been conferred solely because of informational
harm. Informational harm, construed broadly, could be found in every
situation; therefore, the court warned against such a broad view,
especially where statutes which provide for the dissemination of public
information were involved. The court held that such a broad construc-
tion was not consistent with the "injury in fact" requirement. It stated
41. The animal nexus would allow a plaintiff to establish standing based on
observation of one or more individuals in a group of animals, not necessarily the specific
animal(s) involved in the case. Id. at 566.
42. The vocational nexus would confer standing on a plaintiff who works with the
species or animal in question, or a plaintiff who works in such a species' habitat. Id.
43. 901 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Plaintiffs were consumer organizations who
petitioned for review of orders promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration. The orders lowered the minimum fuel economy standards for passenger
cars. Plaintiffs claimed that the standards did not adequately reflect safety considerations
or the fact that larger and heavier vehicles were safer. Id.
44. Id. at 122.
45. In fact, the New EnglandAquaium court stated that the plaintiffs in the subject
case would be entitled to a trial on the question of whether they have standing via the
Competitive Enterprises test, if applicable. CEASE v. New England Aquarium, 836 F.
Supp. at 57.
46. 943 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Plaintiffs, a public interest biotechnology
group, sued the Department of Agriculture for failure to prepare an environmental impact
statement (EIS) in alleged violation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370(a) (1988) (NEPA). Plaintiffs alleged informational harm as they
would be unable to utilize the information an EIS would contain if one was not prepared.
Id. at 85.
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that, beyond the requirements of Competitive Enterprise, plaintiffs must
show a concrete particularized injury.47
Another means of establishing injury in fact is by showing proce-
dural harm. Procedural harm is injury caused when an agency refuses
to follow statutorily required procedures.4" The First Circuit has
discussed procedural harm in Munoz-Mendoza v. Pierce.49 In that case,
the court indicated that "procedural errors" were a basis for judicial
review under the Administrative Procedure Act'-as well as a part of the
universal practice of judicial review." The First Circuit looked at the
underlying purpose of the National Environmental Policy Act52 and
determined that procedural harm can constitute a real injury.53 The
Supreme Court has also indicated that procedural harm is a legitimate
cause of "injury in fact." The Court in Defenders of Wildlife stated,
"[w]e do not hold that an individual cannot enforce procedural rights; he
assuredly can, so long as the procedures in question are designed to
protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis
of his standing."'
The New England Aquarium court further narrowed the injury in fact
element of standing by requiring that an informationally harmed plaintiff
first suffer procedural harm in order to have an "injury in fact."' In
doing so, the court made the failure to inform the public insufficient
grounds for suit. This holding is in conflict with one of the intents of
the MMPA-that the public should be informed of takings and handling
47. Id. at 86-87.
48. United States v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 118 (1st Cir. 1992).
49. 711 F.2d 421 (lst Cir. 1983). Minority residents of Boston brought action
challenging the decision of the Department of Housing and Urban Development to grant
money to the city to develop a commercial complex. Plaintiffs' standing was challenged.
Id. at 422-423.
50. The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to "hold unlawful and set
aside agency action ... [performed] without observance of procedure required by law."
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(d) (1994).
51. Munoz-Mendoza v. Pierce, 711 F.2d at 428.
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a) (1988).
53. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1989). "Mhe harm at
stake in a NEPA violation is a harm to the environment, not merely to a legalistic
'procedure'.... mhe risk implied by a violation of NEPA is that real environmental
harm will occur through inadequate foresight and deliberation." Id. at 504.
54. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8 (emphasis added).
55. CEASE v. New England Aquarium, 836 F.2d at 58.
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of marine mammals." The court also blocked one of the few remaining
avenues by which environmental groups could bring suit under the
Administrative Procedures Act when they have been denied information
that is pertinent to the continuance of their organizational purposes.
III. SUBJECT CASE
Kama was born in captivity at Sea World in San Diego in 1981. In
1987 he was transferred to the New England Aquarium for breeding
and/or public display purposes. As Kama did not fit into the social
environment of the aquarium, he was not used for either purpose and the
aquarium requested permission from the Secretary of Commerce to
transfer Kama to the U.S. Navy. The Navy filed a similar request with
the Secretary. The Secretary issued a Letter of Agreement to the Navy
that set forth the obligations of the Navy to ensure Kama's safety and
well-being. Kama was transferred pursuant to that Letter. Kama now
resides in Hawaii, where the Navy uses him for scientific research
regarding his sonar capabilities.5"
This suit, brought by animal rights groups Citizens to End Animal
Suffering and Exploitation (CEASE), the Progressive Animal Welfare
Society (PAWS), and the Animal Legal Defense Fund, has focused
attention on the broad issues of how and when marine mammals are
taken from the wild. These groups are concerned with modifications to
the permitting process59 which allow Letters of Agreement to be issued
instead of permits. These "Letters" are frequently used when animals
are being transferred between facilities or when qualified institutions
rescue beached or sick marine mammals.' The groups are mainly
concerned with what happens to the animals after the transfers.6' If the
56. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1488, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1972).
57. When a party seeks judicial review of agency action under the general review
provision of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994), he must meet
two requirements: (1) plaintiff mustidentify the agency action affecting his interests, and
(2) he must demonstrate that the interest sought to be protected is within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute. Association of Data Processing
Service Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
58. CEASE v. New England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. at 46-47.
59. See supra note 17.
60. CEASE v. New England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. at 47.
61. Jeff Hecht, Suit and Countersuit Over Dolphin's Rights; Lawsuits Filed by
Animal Rights Groups and New EnglandAquariumAgainst Each Other, NEW ScMNTIST,
Oct. 12, 1991, at 15.
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government doesn't provide information on transfers of the animals, the
plaintiffs cannot follow such incidents and determine the animals'
ultimate fate.62
The aquarium, on the other hand, sees this suit as frivolous
harassment that would undermine the aquarium's program for rescuing
stranded whales and dolphins. The aquarium filed a five million dollar
defamation counter-suit in an effort to fight back.'
Plaintiffs claimed that defendants violated the plain language of the
MMPA by transporting/transferring Kama without obtaining a permit
from the Secretary of Commerce.' Defendants contended that the statute
should be viewed in an integrated manner, and as such, the permitting
section of the MMPA should be found to apply only to marine mammals
in the wild. Therefore, defendants claimed, a permit was not required
for the transfer of a marine mammal already in captivity.'
Plaintiffs further alleged they were injured by the transfer of Kama
as they were no longer able to observe and study him; that the transfer
of Kama contributes to the depletion of wild dolphins; that the Secre-
tary's failure to follow the permit procedures denied plaintiffs notice of
the transfer, the opportunity to comment and request a hearing regarding
the transfer, and the opportunity to disseminate information to their
members. Plaintiffs also claimed that transferring marine mammals
pursuant to Letters of Agreement is contrary to the MMPA, as it is
bypassing the permit process without notifying the public. Finally,
plaintiffs contended that transferring marine mammals pursuant to Letters
of Agreement is a violation of the National Environmental Policy Act.'
The court dismissed the claim on defendants' motion for summary
judgment, holding that plaintiffs did not meet the "injury in fact" prong
of the test for standing as set out in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.6'
The court held that plaintiffs had not suffered any actual harm because
62. The 1994 Amendments to the MMPA allow transfers of animals already in
captivity between facilities permitted for public display or scientific research without
following the permit process. H.R. REP. No. 439, 103d Cong., 2d Sess, at 5 (1994).
63. Fox Butterfield, Claiming Harassment, Aquarium Sues 3Animal Rights Groups,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1991, at A18.
64. 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(4) (1988).
65. CEASE v. New England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. at 47-48.
66. Id. at 48. The National Environmental Policy Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
4321-4370 (1988).
67. See supra note 22.
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they had not suffered procedural or informational harm.' The court
expanded the requirements for informational harm as set forth in
Competitive Enterprise Institute v. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration and required a plaintiff to also suffer procedural harm
in order to find "injury in fact." Informational harm alone, according
to this court, is insufficient to constitute injury in fact.7°
IV. DIscussION
A. Plaintiffs Have Met the "Injury in Fact" Requirement
The New England Aquarium court states that plaintiffs have not met
the injury in fact requirement of standing. The court predicates its
holding on the following chain of logic: informational harm and
procedural harm are inextricably intertwined; the individual plaintiffs
have not suffered procedural harm; the court won't find informational
harm without procedural harm; therefore, no plaintiffs (including the
organizations) have suffered "injury in fact" and, thus, none have
standing to sue. While this analysis may be logically sound under some
circumstances, the court erred in its application to the organizational
plaintiffs in this case.
The New England Aquarium court never analyzed whether the
organizational plaintiffs had suffered procedural harm. It simply
concluded that because the individual plaintiffs did not suffer procedural
harm, the organizational plaintiffs could not have suffered procedural
harm either. The court then determined that plaintiffs may have suffered
informational harm, but that that harm alone is insufficient to confer
standing because informational harm is inconsistent with the requirement
of a concrete injury. What the court failed to consider, however, was
that the MMPA requires the dissemination of the information and that
these plaintiffs needed this information to continue their organizational
purposes. Therefore, they did suffer informational harm. Because
procedures required by the MMPA were not followed, plaintiffs also
suffered procedural harm. Therefore, the plaintiffs in this case should
have met the "injury in fact" element of standing.
68. See supra note 22.
69. See supra note 41.
70. CEASE v. New England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. at 57-58.
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1. Informational Harm
The court in the subject case stated that "plaintiffs' desire for
information cannot be said to evidence more than the organizations' and
their members' 'long-standing . . . interest' in the issue of animal
welfare.'"' The court dismisses plaintiffs' claim that their ability to
achieve the organization's corporate purpose had been impaired.
However, if the group purports to follow transfers, and other activities
that affect animals such as Kama, they need the information necessary to
do so. The court is correct that mere interest in a problem is not
enough;' however, informational harm together with procedural harm
goes beyond "mere interest." As such, the New England Aquarium court
needed to consider the relationship between both types of alleged harm
before reaching a conclusion.
The New England Aquarium court chose to apply the Lyng73 test
instead of the more liberal one outlined in Competitive Enterprises.74
The court stated, "where ... there is insufficient evidence of any other
'concrete and particularized injury' to confer, or contribute to, a finding
of standing, evidence of informational harm alone is inadequate to defeat
a motion for summary judgment based on lack of standing.""5 However,
the Lyng and Competitive Enterprise decisions are consistent and should
be applied together. The Lyng court merely qualified the decision
reached in Competitive Enterprises (and did so in dicta). Lyng warns
against suits based on informational harm alleged by plaintiffs who would
like to have information, as opposed to plaintiffs who are entitled to such
information under statutes that require its dissemination.76
Competitive Enterprises provides the applicable test regarding
informational harm.77 The plaintiffs in the New England Aquarium case
71. Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972)).
72. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 84-85 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972)).
73. Id. at 79. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
74. CEASE v. New England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. at 57.
75. Id. at 58.
76. Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1994),
limited the holding of Competitive Enterprise to cases brought by concerned organizations
under statutes that require dissemination of information to the public, such as NEPA and
the MMPA.
77. See supra Section II. Competitive Enterprise Inst. v. National Highway Traffic
Safety Admin., 901 F.2d at 122.
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met this test. The permit information was essential to their activities
because the purpose of their organization is to observe and monitor
marine mammals, specifically those animals located at the New England
Aquarium. By allowing the transfer of Kama without notifying the
public, the Secretary rendered their activities infeasible. Plaintiffs didn't
know Kama was being moved and therefore could not fulfill one of the
organizations' objectives. This combination creates informational harm
and constitutes injury in fact. Therefore, if the Secretary had required
a permit application and had published such application, plaintiffs would
have had the information they required and would not have been
deprived of the opportunity to protest the issuance of the permit.
2. Procedural Harm
In determining that plaintiffs did not suffer procedural harm, the New
England Aquarium court relies on two principal cases: Defenders of
Wildlife7 s and United States v. AVX Corp.79 While these cases do state
that procedural harm alone is generally insufficient to establish injury in
fact, they do not preclude it altogether. The Court stated in Lujan that
an individual can enforce procedural rights so long as the procedures in
question are designed to protect a threatened concrete interest of his that
is the ultimate basis of his standing.' The Court gives several examples
of when procedural harm is a valid basis for standing. One example is
particularly analogous to the New England Aquarium case: "one living
adjacent to the site for proposed construction of a federally licensed dam
has standing to challenge the licensing agency's failure to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), even though he cannot establish
with any certainty that the Statement will cause the license to be withheld
or altered ... ."1 In the same sense that an EIS provides notice to
neighbors of a construction site, the public notice requirements of the
78. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). See supra part 11.
79. 962 F.2d 108 (lst Cir. 1992). In this case, the National Wildlife Federation
(NWF), an intervenor in the lower court, tried to appeal the entry of a consent decree
concerning the cleanup of New Bedford Harbor, Massachusetts. The original parties to
the litigation successfully contended that NWF lacked standing to appeal. NWF claimed
standing on, among other grounds, procedural injury. However, the AVX court relied
on the Eighth Circuit opinion in Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir.
1990), rev'd, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
80. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8.
81. Id. at 572 n.7.
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MMPA provide information to individuals and organizations whose
purpose is protection and preservation of marine mammals.
B. Congressional Intent
The New England Aquarium court's holding fails to give sufficient
weight to the public notice requirements of the MMPA. In Committee
for Humane Legislation, Inc. v. Richardson," an early case interpreting
the MMPA, the D.C. Circuit stated that the basic purpose for enactment
of the MMPA was to provide marine mammals, especially porpoise, with
necessary and extensive protection against man's activities.' One means
of protecting these mammals is via public participation in the decision-
making process. Environmental groups, and particularly animal rights
groups, constitute a significant portion of the "interested public." A
recent commentator noted, "[t]he environmental community is generally
an open one that is accustomed to demanding public participation in
decision making and to relying on public access to government informa-
tion. Environmental nongovernmental organizations consider that they
have an essential role in keeping governments accountable for their
environmental protection practices."'
The MMPA embodies this belief in section 1374(d)(2),' where
Congress instructs the Secretary to publish notice of permit applications.
The legislative history of the MMPA makes this point even more clearly:
"[t]he public is invited and encouraged to participate fully in the agency
decision-making process. The agencies are further required to provide
full information to interested members of the public on what the
implications of the program and of any proposed agency actions may
be."86 Clearly, Congress was thinking of plaintiffs such as the
organizational plaintiffs in the New England Aquarium case when making
the foregoing statement.
Unfortunately, the New England Aquarium court did not analyze the
situation as thoroughly as it should have. After granting defendants'
82. Plaintiffs, an animal rights group, challenged a NMFS permit which allowed
purse-seine fishing for yellowfm tuna "on porpoise." Committee for Humane
Legislation, Inc. v. Richardson, 540 F.2d. 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
83. Id. at 1148.
84. Edith Brown Weiss, Environment and Trade as Partners in Sustainable
Development: A Commentary, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 728, 734-735 (1992).
85. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(d)(2) (1972).
86. H.R. CoNp. REP. No. 1488, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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motion for summary judgment, the court gives several recommendations
to plaintiffs as to how they may better achieve their purposes.' The
court first suggests plaintiffs resort to the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA). The FOIA allows the public to request and receive informa-
tion regarding agency actions. The MMPA was enacted after the FOIA,
and Congress explicitly inserted public notification requirements in the
MMPA. Resort to other Acts apparently was not within Congress'
intentions and therefore should not be necessary. Besides defeating
Congress' intent, forcing plaintiffs to resort to such an unnecessary
means of obtaining information is a waste of public resources.
The court also suggests that plaintiffs participate in the political
process and lobby for Congressional amendments or interpretations of the
MMPA provisions in question. While this is an interesting suggestion,
it provides more of a long term solution rather than resolution of the
immediate question; 9 the political wheels move slowly. Furthermore,
plaintiffs should not have to lobby for an interpretation of a statute which
is plain on its face; in both the MMPA and its legislative history
Congress clearly stated that takings of marine mammals require permits,
and permit applications must be published. As Congress had not yet
spoken differently on this issue,' plaintiffs should not have been thrown
out of court.
V. CONCLUSION
It is clear from the legislative history that Congress fully intended
the public to be informed of any agency action under the MMPA. The
MMPA requires that an interested party have the ability to comment on
87. CEASE v.,New England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. at 59.
88. The Freedom of Information Act of 1966, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
89. If plaintiffs resorted to the political process, Kama could well be dead before
they see results. The average lifespan of a dolphin is 30 years. Eric Gamalinda,
Philippines: Tuna Canneries Pressured to Stop Dolphin Deaths, Inter Press Service
Global Information Network, Dec. 22, 1992, available in Westlaw, Magsplus Database,
1992 WL 2481396.
90. Although the 1994 Amendments to the Marine Mammal Protection Act show
Congress' apparent change of mind on this issue (see H.R. REP. No. 439, supra note
63), they do not necessarily change the effect of the law in this case. Plaintiffs would
no longer have a cause of action to bring suit; however, it is possible that plaintiffs in
a similar situation involving a marine mammal in the wild would still be unable to show
the requisite harm.
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or protest a permit. That ability can only be exercised if the Secretary
fulfills his duty under the MMPA and publishes the fact that someone
applied for a permit. When those facts are not published, organizational
plaintiffs such as the ones in the New England Aquarium case clearly
suffer informational harm, as well as procedural harm.
The court's holding is another step in the disturbing trend towards
summarily rejecting claims made by environmental plaintiffs under the
MMPA and similar statutes." This decision places an additional burden
on environmental plaintiffs that is neither supported nor suggested by
prior case law. Such a burden effectively closes the door to organiza-
tional plaintiffs in a manner contrary to the express intent of Congress
under the MMPA. If these groups, whose very purpose is to gather and
disseminate information regarding marine mammals, cannot sue to
protect their right to do so, who can?
91. There has been extensive litigation under similar provisions in the National
Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988), and the Endangered Species
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1988).
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